

## RECENT ATTACKS AGAINST SUMMATION, SHRINKING AND SELF-SHRINKING STREAM CIPHERS - SHORT SURVEY

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**Abstract:** *This paper discusses recent attacks against summation, shrinking and self-shrinking stream ciphers. Some attacks against shrinking stream cipher are applicable also against self-shrinking stream cipher.*

### Introduction

Research of resistance against cryptography attacks is one of the most important requirements to the stream ciphers. The attacks and statistical researches form complete picture of stream ciphers properties.

This paper shortly notates the most recent attacks against summation [27], shrinking [6] and self-shrinking [24] stream ciphers.

### Basics of the summation, shrinking and self-shrinking stream ciphers

The summation combiner is a stream cipher in which two maximal periods' binary Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) [25] sequences of periods  $2^l$  and  $2^s-1$ , are combined using addition-with-carry, but the carry is saved and added in at the next stage.

In the shrinking generator, a control LFSR  $R_0$  is used to select a portion of the output sequence of a second LFSR  $R_1$ . The produced keystream is a shrunken, irregularly decimated subsequence of the output sequence of  $R_1$ , as depicted in Fig. 1.

The algorithm of shrinking stream cipher consists of the following steps:

1. Registers  $R_0$  and  $R_1$  are clocked.
2. If the output of  $R_0$  is 1, the output bit of  $R_1$  forms a part of the keystream.
3. If the output of  $R_0$  is 0, the output bit of  $R_1$  is discarded.




Fig. 1. Shrinking stream cipher

Suppose that the connection polynomials of  $R_0$  and  $R_1$  are chosen uniformly at random from the set of all primitive polynomials of degrees  $L_0$  and  $L_1$  over  $\mathbf{Z}_2$ . Then the distribution of patterns in output sequence is almost uniform.

The self-shrinking generator is based on the shrinking principle. It requires only one maximal length LFSR. The self-shrinking cipher requires a tuple  $(a_{2i}, a_{2i+1})$  as input and outputs  $a_{2i+1}$  if and only if  $a_{2i} = 1$ .

The 2-adic summation-shrinking bitstream generator is proposed in [29] with the period and linear complexity.

In [30] the N-adic summation-shrinking generator is proposed, Fig.2.




Fig.2 N-adic Summation-Shrinking Generator

The results from statistical analysis show that the sequence generated by the cipher is uniform, scalable, uncompressible, with large period; consistent and unpredictable.

### Recent attacks against summation, shrinking and self-shrinking stream ciphers

Regardless of big period and high linear complexity the summation stream cipher is vulnerable to correlation attacks of Meier [14], Meier and Staffelbach [22], [23], Dawson [9] and to the attacks of 2-adic complexity of Klapper and Goresky [21]. These attacks are feasible if the summation stream cipher is constructed from low degree polynomials LFSRs.

There are few attacks against shrinking stream cipher. The main attack is divide-and-conquer, which performs exhaustive search among all of possible initial states and minimal polynomials of controlling LFSR [6].

Courtois and Meier propose algebraic attack against LFSR-oriented stream ciphers with filter as a nonlinear part [8]. The adapting of this attack to the LFSR-oriented stream ciphers with memory is made from Armknecht и Krause [1].

Gollic and O'Connor propose in [17] correlation attack, which is experimentally analyzed in [28]. Studies [15], [17] and [19] propose correlation attacks with reduced complexity on the base of searching for the specific subsequences in the output keystream of the cipher.

A breakthrough in attacking shrinking stream cipher is achieved by Biryukov and Shamir with the compromised attack "time-memory-data" [2], generalized by Hong and Sarkar in [18]. The parameters to attack are the time  $T$  for the real phase, the memory  $M$  – hard discs and the enemy owned data size  $D$ . Is used the formula  $TM^2D^2 = S^2$ , where  $S$  is the searching space size.

Some modifications of the shrinking stream cipher attacks exist in the studies [3], [4], [5], [7], [10], [11], [12], [13], [16], [20], [87], [31], [33] and [34].

Attacks against shrinking stream cipher are also applicable against self-shrinking stream cipher if it is LFSRs constructed. There are attacks directly oriented against self-shrinking stream cipher [24], [26], [32], [35], but not sufficiently effective.

There are no other published attack methods against 2-adic summation-shrinking and N-adic summation-shrinking stream ciphers.

## Conclusion

This is a short survey on recent attack methods against summation, shrinking and self-shrinking stream ciphers. It can be useful as a starting point for further cryptanalytic research.

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